ditures for which physicians are liable through concurrent or future fee reductions.
Placing a global budget over a fee-for-service payment system com prising thousands o f independent physician practices, each billing against the budget, creates a significant utilization management challenge for the profession, a challenge made more difficult by the paucity of man agement levers available to policy makers in either the profession or the government. To make matters worse, at the same tim e that an expen diture cap intensifies the professions need for collective, cooperative approaches to utilization management, the "beggar-thy-neighbor" facet o f global caps makes gaining that cooperation more difficult. A global cap creates a strategic game among fee-for-service physicians, a game that can generate growing utilization as each physician noncooperatively increases billings in an attem pt to capture a sufficient share of the budget. From an individual physician's perspective under a cap, the benefits of increased billing accrue to him-or herself while the costs are spread among all physicians (in the form o f fee adjustments when total billings exceed the budget). A physician who restrains his or her billing when others do not also do so risks losing the most financially; that same physician gains the most by not restraining billing when all others do so. Hence, a physician's behavior depends in part on how he or she thinks other physicians will respond. The capped budget also exacer bates internal divisions within the profession as subgroups of physicians (defined, for example, by specialty, age, urban/rural location) vie for their share o f the fixed budget (Katz et al. 199~) .
These incentive and management problems pose serious obstacles to the successful use o f global physician expenditure caps. Global caps, especially hard caps, can unquestionably contain costs, but unless these management problems are overcome caps can be extremely destabiliz ing both for the profession and for government policy (Barer, Lomas, and Sanmartin 1996) . Explosive utilization growth deriving from stra tegic responses by individual physicians to the individual-collective incentive conflict may appear inevitable. But analyses o f other sectors characterized by the same incentive conflict, most notably common property resources (e.g., water aquifers, fisheries, shared grazing land), demonstrate that such an outcome is not inevitable. These analyses also indicate that crafting "better" financial incentive structures, although important, is only one (and not necessarily the dominant) consideration in managing utilization.
In this article we report on a case study o f the experiences of two Canadian provinces with global physician expenditure caps: Alberta and Nova Scotia. Between the two provinces, only Nova Scotia displays evidence o f explosive utilization growth under the cap, despite the fact that it better designed the financial incentive structure o f its cap policy to reduce the financial advantage o f increased utilization. W e use a framework derived from the study o f common property resources to analyze the provinces' experiences under physician expenditure caps, particularly in order to understand the utilization responses. Aspects of the analysis also draw on a more general analytic framework for study ing funding structures and the associated financial incentives, a frame work that emphasizes the critical role played by interpretive processes that translate funding structures into financial incentives for affected individuals and organizations (Giacomini et al. 1996) . Because an identical funding structure may impart different meanings to differ ent actors in a health care system, it may create different behavioral incentives.
Data for the case study were collected from semistructured interviews and changes in the design o f the policies over tim e (see below) made it difficult to interpret some answers, we use survey responses only selec tively to illustrate findings from other sources. P h y sician E xp en d itu re Cap P o licies: D e sig n and R esponses in A lb erta and N ova S co tia Canadas public insurance system covers all "medically required" phy sician services at no cost to the patient. There is no balance billing by physicians, and the purchase o f private insurance to cover services in cluded in the public plan is prohibited. Fee-for-service payment dom inates in the physician sector in each Canadian province. Fee levels and other aspects of physician remuneration are set through periodic nego tiations between each province's government and medical association.
Both Alberta and Nova Scotia introduced hard global physician ex penditure caps on April 1, 1992, as part o f long-term, multiyear agree ments. Hard caps have been in force in each province since that time.
The initial levels o f the caps differed across the two provinces: Alberta provided an immediate increase (5.5 percent) over the previous years expenditure and included provisions for budget increases in subsequent years; Nova Scotia's policy provided no budget increase in the first two years o f the cap, permitted a 3 percent increase in the third year, and made provisions for increases in subsequent years. In each province, however, only 18 months after implementation, newly elected govern ments reopened the agreements seeking budget reductions. In Alberta, a 10 percent budget reduction was negotiated in May 1994, and a further reduction o f approximately 5 percent was negotiated in Decem ber 1995. In Nova Scotia, a two-year agreement signed in March 1995, after more than a year o f acrimonious negotiation, provided for a 7.5 percent budget reduction. In both provinces, the new agreements also modified the design o f the global cap and related policies in light of their initial experiences. Physician utilization responses to the global cap differed notably across the two provinces. A comparison of red fee-for-service expendi tures in each province (adjusted for fee changes and changes in the definition of global budgets over the period) reveals that whereas uti lization was well controlled in Alberta, it increased throughout the period in Nova Scotia (table l) . Nova Scotia's steady utilization growth (as measured by real, fee-adjusted expenditures) left to td utilization in 1 9 9 4 -9 5 at 7.7 percent above the 1 9 9 1 -9 2 base and utilization per physician at 6.8 percent above its base-year level. This growth required reductions to the fee schedule on at least three occasions in an effort to keep expenditures within the budget. 
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In contrast, total utilization in Alberta was essentially flat for the first two years of the cap policy, followed by a moderate increase in the third year, which in 1 9 9 4 -9 5 left it at just 2.3 percent above the 1 9 9 1 -9 2 base. Change in physician supply, however, meant that utilization per physician in 1 9 9 4 -95 was actually 2.2 percent below its base-year level.
Physicians were so sensitized that a small fee reduction o f 0 .9 percent in August 1993 caused utilization to drop by 3 to 4 percent. A t one point, the head of the general practice section of the Alberta Medical Associ ation (AMA) even sent a letter to GPs, encouraging them to increase utilization, which had fallen so much that they were going to end the year well under budget (utilization did increase, but it still came in under budget). Later, when utilization growth once again became a concern, a letter from the AMA to all o f its members was followed by a drop in utilization.
These utilization differences are all the more surprising because Nova 
Economic Context
Two economic factors likely played a role in the different utilization responses: the background economic pressure faced by physicians in each province when caps were introduced; and the relative (i.e., com pared to historical levels o f funding) size of the capped budgets in each province. practice in the two provinces in the years preceding the expenditure cap policies. Together they suggest that physicians were under greater eco nomic pressure in Nova Scotia. Although the percentage change in fees in the five years preceding the expenditure cap policies was roughly comparable in the two provinces (12.2 percent vs. 12.9 percent), on average, the absolute level o f fees in Nova Scotia's schedule was lower than in Alberta's. The difference between the provinces in the relative size of the bud get in which expenditure caps were introduced may also have contrib uted to the different utilization responses. Nova Scotia's tight first-year budget (0 percent increase) pressured physicians from the start. The early fee reductions caused by overexpenditure started a losing dynamic among physicians: work harder to maintain income, cause the payment rate to fall, work even harder, and so on. In contrast, A lberta's early budget increases made the cap policies more palatable to physicians, created less pressure that would generate a utilization response, and provided breathing space for A lberta's physicians and the AMA to ad just to a cap. This, however, is not the whole story. The early budget increases were subsequently taken away. And, in the period under caps, both the rate o f growth in physician supply and the rate o f growth in population, which represent the most important sources o f utilization pressure on a fixed budget, were greater in Alberta than in Nova Scotia.
Finally, like Alberta, the province o f Ontario had budget increases in the first years o f its cap policy, during which expenditures came in under budget. In the third year, budget reductions like those experienced in Alberta were imposed and since then, unlike Alberta, expenditures have risen continuously, requiring sizable income clawbacks or holdbacks. Hence, although the early budget increase likely plays a role in ex plaining the differential responses, especially right after the caps were introduced, they do not explain the sustained utilization control in Alberta.
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Collective, Participatory Decision M aking among Physicians
Successful management of common-property resources depends on work able institutional arrangements for collective, participatory decision mak ing that gives users a voice. The analysis o f the two provinces suggests that differences in their approaches to negotiating the expenditure cap policies, in the types of agreements each association sought to negotiate, and in the process for approving the negotiated agreements in the pro fession may have fostered greater physician acceptance in Alberta. In contrast, although the negotiation approach in Alberta in the early 1990s has also been characterized as one o f mutual accommoda tion, it had been preceded in the 1970s and 1980s by an adversarial, confrontational style with little trust on each side. During the earlier adversarial phase, the government and the AMA had developed stronger institutional processes for accommodating differences and for conduct ing negotiations in the face o f prolonged conflict. Consequently, despite strained relations created by budget cutbacks, the parties were able to depersonalize issues, maintain a constructive working relationship, and move difficult discussions forward. The relationship between the government and the profession did not break down as it did in Nova Scotia.
The two associations also sought to negotiate quite different types of agreements. The M SNS sought, in the words of one interviewee, an "ironclad" agreement that defined as explicitly and precisely as possible not only the responsibilities of various parties but also the specific mech anisms for carrying them out. In contrast, given the uncertainty as to how events would unfold under the cap, the AMA sought a flexible agreement that would allow solutions to be devised as specific problems arose. So, for instance, although the Alberta agreement clearly specified who was responsible for ensuring that expenditures remained within 
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In each province tensions between the associations staff and leader ship, on one hand, and the physician membership, on the other, were exacerbated by the negotiated agreements that established expenditure caps in each province. The agreements split the tangible benefits and tangible costs along medical-association-practicing-physician lines. The "compensation," or tangible benefits negotiated for accepting an expen diture cap, accrued primarily to the medical associations in the form of a greater voice in health care policy making, sole representation status for the association in negotiations over physician remuneration, and a more secure funding base through either mandatory dues payment to the association by all physicians (in Nova Scotia) or inducements for joining the association (in Alberta). The tangible costs-lower incomesfell squarely on practicing physicians (although in the short term this was ameliorated in Alberta by the initial budget increase). Many phy sicians saw the initial cooperative approach adopted by the MSNS and the AMA as a sign that their associations had been coopted by the government and no longer represented the interests o f the average phy sician.
These factors combined to engender a greater sense of alienation among physicians in Nova Scotia than in Alberta, as well as a sense that the policy was imposed upon them. An interviewee from Nova Scotia 
Defining the Boundaries o f the Budget and Eligible Users
Unambiguously defining the boundaries and the eligible users of the resource helps ensure a common understanding o f the collective limits and makes it easier to know when an outside individual or organization is encroaching on the resource. Both provinces launched initiatives to define (or redefine) the boundaries o f the capped budget and to limit who was eligible to draw on the budget. The initiatives are similar enough across the provinces (and indeed across all the other provinces) that they are unlikely to be critical factors in understanding the differ ential utilization responses in Alberta and Nova Scotia. They do, how ever, highlight some of the challenges faced in im plementing global budgets in the fee-for-service physician sector and some o f the "per verse" side effects o f the expenditure cap policies.
Unlike the task o f defining the boundaries for natural resources, where physical and natural factors play a dominant (though not exclu sive) role, defining the boundaries for a public budget is an inherently social and political exercise. This political-social dimension can hinder achieving physician agreement about the nature of the collective prob lem and alternative solutions. Some physicians argue that the best strat egy in the face o f the cap is not to manage utilization but to lobby to expand the budget through political actions. Indeed, in each province the medical associations and physicians waged political and public re lations campaigns that challenged the global budget policies in general and the budget reductions in particular. The most successful public relation efforts built precisely on the p u blics concern for access to highquality care by portraying physicians as defenders of the system fighting against ill-advised and capricious government actions (Cernetig 1995; Moulton 1994).
Physicians quite legitim ately worked to lim it inappropriate claims on the capped budgets by calling on the government to clarify and better enforce existing legislation that prohibited billing the public insurance plan for nonmedically necessary services requested by third parties (e.g., an employment physical) and for services associated with worker compensation claims. Bu t in defending the borders o f their newly defined budget, physicians also hampered other policy initiatives.
Physicians at times resisted the movement o f certain diagnostic services from an inpatient to an outpatient or office setting because it can shift billings for the technical component o f a procedure (intended to cover, for example, equipment, supplies) from the inpatient hospital budget to the capped physician budget. And although the global cap increased physician interest in alternative payment modalities (Alberta Medical Association 1995) , disagreement about the amount of funds to be trans ferred from the fee-for-service budget when a physician changes modal ities has forestalled the development o f these alternatives.
Physicians' attem pts to relieve the economic pressure of the cap were at times potentially in conflict with broader system goals. De-insuring services from the public plan, which agreements in both provinces called for, is a case in point. De-insuring services benefits physicians by re ducing pressure on the capped budget while expanding income-earning opportunities in the unconstrained private sector. It can, however, con flict with the stated principle o f ensuring reasonable access to all med ically necessary services. Similarly, uncoordinated provincial efforts to lim it the growth in the number o f physicians who can bill the public plan in a province, as occurred when Alberta included a provision in its 1994 agreement that called for a short-term restriction on issuing bill ing numbers to non-Alberta-trained physicians, hinder attempts to de velop national health human resource policies. Physician mobility in Canada has been reduced by a series o f provincial policies that lim it the ability o f new or relocating physicians to obtain a public insurance billing number or to be reimbursed at the full listed fee (Barer, Lomas, and Sanmartin 1996) .
Rules o f Use, Monitoring, and Sanctions
Rules o f use ensure that withdrawals are kept to a sustainable level and that no one individual draws excessively on the budget, helping to ensure that the resource is shared equitably. Such rules require moni toring and sanctioning mechanisms, which are embodied in cap policies in the holdback/clawback mechanisms and individual billing thresh olds. These go to the heart o f the incentive problem. Nova Scotia's policy, which clearly delineated the consequences o f exceeding the budr get at the collective level and provided incentives to control billings at the individual level, was better designed to m itigate the collectiveindividual incentive problem. Each province's 1992 agreement vested a newly created joint governm ent-m edical association management-consultation committee with the responsibility for regularly monitoring expenditures against the budget and im plementing holdback/clawback adjustments required to ensure that expenditures stayed within budget. The Nova Scotia agreement prescribed that, when adjustments were required, the joint com m ittee make across-the-board adjustments to the master unit value (the base scale for its fee schedule). In contrast, the 1992 Alberta agree ment left the choice o f adjustment mechanism to the finance subcom m ittee o f the joint committee. The mechanism could be across-the-board fee adjustments, selective fee adjustments based on the source of utili zation growth (by service category, specialty group, or geographic re gion), or methods other than fee adjustm ents. The com m ittee could consult within profession in making such judgments.
At the individual level, A lberta's 1992 policy did not include individual-level billing thresholds. Nova Scotia's included individuallevel billing thresholds specific to each o f five specialty groupings (general/family practice, medical specialties, surgical specialties, hospitalbased physicians, and technology-based physicians). The thresholds were set so that approximately the top 5 percent of billing physicians in each grouping were affected. Once a physician reached the threshold in his or her specialty grouping, additional claims were paid at 4 0 percent of the normal fee in the first year, 50 percent in the second, and 60 percent in the third year of the agreement.
The renegotiated agreements reached in 1994 and 1995 reinforced these tendencies across the provinces, strengthening the incentives tar geted at individual physicians in Nova Scotia while weakening them in Alberta. Physicians in both provinces disliked fee adjustments, which made revenues unpredictable and which they found disturbing because the previous 20 years o f negotiations (and a national debate over bal anced billing) had imbued fees with ideological and symbolic meaning.
(Tuohy [1 9 8 8 ] analyzes the role o f such ideological and symbolic factors in the context of the debate over balance billing that took place in Canada a decade ago.) From a public relations perspective the AMA also resisted upward fee adjustments when expenditures were below budget (as they were the first two years) because the public perceived such changes as an income increase for physicians during a tim e o f general fiscal restraint. Both provinces therefore wanted to change the clawback/ holdback mechanisms. In its 19 9 4 and 1995 agreements, Alberta opted to use the accumulated surpluses from the first two years (supplemented by monies from the government) to create a reserve fund for handling budget surpluses and shortfalls. The reserve fund reduced the need to adjust fees by acting as a holding fund for surpluses and as a source of funds to pay back the government when expenditures exceeded the budget. The AMA also negotiated a right to allocate monies from the reserve fund to address specific issues of concern to the profession (e.g., additional malpractice premium subsidies and a transition adjustment program for physicians adversely affected by the cap). This reserve pool approach simultaneously served a number of purposes: better public relations, fee stability, flexible responses to novel problems associated with the cap, and a new role for the AMA as manager. It also shielded individual physicians even more from immediate consequences of ex cessive billing.
In contrast, in return for a guarantee that the master unit value would not be adjusted during the life o f the 1995 agreement, physicians in Nova Scotia opted to substitute increased lim itations at the individual level for regular overall budget reconciliations. It added a set o f common individual billing thresholds (i.e., the same for all physicians) on top of the specialty-group-specific thresholds already in place. Reconciliation of total expenditures against total budget would only occur at the end o f the two-year agreement. The agreement ended in March 1997, and dispute over how to handle the overage is presently taking place.
Conflict Resolution
The caps created two primary axes o f conflict: between the profession and the government and among physicians within the profession. Con flict between the government and the profession has existed since the start o f public insurance and bilateral negotiations over fee changes, but expenditure caps intensified this conflict. Both provincial agreements specified conflict resolution mechanisms (binding arbitration) to be used when negotiations over new agreements reached an impasse. No such disputes have gone to binding arbitration under caps. The agree m ents also specified conflict resolution mechanisms for resolving differences within the joint government-association committees and differences of interpretation regarding provisions of an agreement. Again, these mechanisms appear not to have played a large role in handling conflict under caps in either provinces.
Much o f the conflict between the profession and the government played out in the political arena (as occurred in the public relations campaigns to win the backing o f the public described above) or at the negotiating table (as was evident during the spring o f 1994 through 1995 when the government and the AMA were in nearly constant ne gotiations and through 1994 when negotiations in Nova Scotia alter nately stalled and started up). As has been noted, the political, public conflict between physicians and the government was more heated in Nova Scotia than Alberta. In both provinces, new governments elected in 1993 imposed the budget cuts. Compared to the M SNS, however, the AMA faced a more popular, maverick provincial government that gar nered national attention for its novel deficit-cutting strategies. This may have made the AMA more cautious about how it challenged the 
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